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INDUSTRIAL LOCATION AND THE EAST AFRICAN COMMON MARKET 
Introduction. 
This paper is a brief summary of an attempt to analyse the relationship 
between the common market and the location of industry in East Africa. The 
relationship is a complex one insofar as it is a two-way process - the common 
market has had a profound influence on the pattern of industrial location 
in East Africa as a whole while at the same time, the pattern of industrial 
location has determined, to a significant extent, not only the mode of 
operation and institutional configuration of the common market but has also 
led to a questioning of its rationale and the usefulness of its continued 
existence. 
To understand and explain any given situation it is necessary to 
analyse those historical factors which were of importance in shaping and 
determining what is now accepted as the status quo. From this point of 
view, it can be argued that the situation in East Africa in the 1960's 
was the outcome of continuing historical processes, the origins of which 
can be traced to the period between 1890 to approximately 1930. The paper 
therefore begins with a short discussion of the major political and 
economic forces which were responsible for shaping the development of 
East Africa. 
The Historical Background. 
The construction of the railway provides us with the key to an 
understanding of both the early development of the region and subsequent 
events. The building of a railway into the interior had been an early 
ambition of the Imperial British East Africa Company, and the usefulness 
of such a link in consolidating British influence in Uganda, surpressing 
the slave trade and (perhaps most important) developing legitimate trade 
could not be denied. The initial survey work began in 1892 and was 
completed in March 1893, the estimated length of the railway being 657 
miles at a total cost of £2,240,000. The British Government did not come 
to any immediate decision concerning construction, but with the declaration 
of a Protectorate over Uganda in April 1894 the fear of international 
rivalry (it was felt that if the British did not build a railway to Lake 
Victoria, the Germans would) and the desire to exploit the economic potential 
of the area took on a greater urgency, and by 1896 a Bill had passed through 
both Houses of Parliament, authorising the expenditure of £3 million,, 
Rapid progress was made impossible by the nature'and vegetation of 
the terrain over which the railway passed and it took 22 months to lay out 
the first 200 miles of lineo (1) But by May 1899 the rails had reached 
what was to become Nairobi^ and it was there that the headquarters of the 
railway were established in July of that year. In December 1901 the first 
locomotive was run through to the shores of Lake Victoria to Port Florence 
(Kisumu), but another two years were to pass before the railway could properly 
be regarded as completed, and in October 1903, the responsibility for running 
the railway was handed over to the administration of the East Africa Protectorate. 
The choice of Nairobi as trie heauq._/
t
,:tcrc of th-- railway administration 
and the future capital of the East Africa Protectorate (the "civilian" 
administration had been transferred from Macbakcs to Nairobi soon after the 
coming of the railway) was a controversial one. The plain on which the town 
was built was swampy and difficult to drain end consequently, in the rainy 
season, it became very unhealthy. Water s».w»!y was poor and the following 
passage is illustrative of the difficulties that had to be faced in the early 
days: "There was an jr«saense amount of work to be done in converting an 
absolutely bare plaifi, 327 miles from, the nearest place where even a nail 
could be purchased, into a busy railway centre. Roads and bridges had to 
be constructed, houses ana workshops built, turn-tables and station quarters 
errected, a water supply laid on, and a hundred and one other things done 
which go to the making of a r a t o w n s h i p . Wonderfully joon, however, the 
nucleus of the present town began to take shape, and a thriving bazaar 
sprang into existence with a mushroom-like growth. In this, however, a case 
or two of plague broke out before very long, so I gave the natives and Indians 
who inhabited it an hour's notice to clear cut, and on my own responsibility 
promptly burned the whole place to the ground." (2) 
But in spite of constant criticism, the inertia of development secured 
Nairobi's existence and by 1901 it was a town of 8,000 inhabitants. By 1906 
the population ha^ ncT-o^prl <-o 11 . s^o
 w
 - this early stage in its 
development, Nairobi was beginning to assume the functions it was to perform 
as the future capital city. 
A logical and natural corollary to the.construction of the railway 
was the opening up of the area for trade and settler immigration. It was 
soon realised that the Asian immigrants (3) either could not or would not 
develop the natural resources of the area and thus European settlement was 
seen as the only means of making the railway ultimately profitable. Large 
areas of land were offered at ludicrously cheap prices and by 1903, there were 
about 100 Europeans settled in or near Nairobi- South Africans began arriving 
in relatively large numbers in 1904, and the end of the First World War 
brought a new influx of settlers under the Soldier Settler's scheme. 
The European settlers were responsible for the early agricultural 
processing projects. A bacon factory (Uplands) had been established at Limuru 
and was taking all the pigs the settlers could rear. In 1908, Lord Delamere 
formed a company (Unga Ltd.) to begin wheat milling and later diversified 
his interests, opening butchers shops in Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa and 
securing a contract to supply mutton to ships calling at Kilindini. The 
future for the production of dairy products appeared to be good and in 1909 
the soda deposits at Magadi were inspected with a view to exploitation. 
The East African Customs Union; Early History 
The increasing concentration of Europeans in Nairobi and the "White 
Highlands" (the latter being so defined originally to exclude Asians rather 
than Africans) led to a similar concentration of political power, and the 
Kenyan Europeans were thus able to dominate effectively customs union economic 
policies. It has been pointed out elsewhere (4) that the customs union was 
not the end product of lengthy economic deliberations; on the contrary, it 
was the child of historical accident and unco-ordinated administrative decisions, 
although the area did have a history of administrative and commercial contact, 
based on varying forms of co-operation and the Congo Basin Treaties did 
give a certain imperialist unity to the area. 
In 1900, Uganda had imposed a 5% rate of ad valorem duty on all goods 
entering the Protectorate. Goods entering Uganda via German East Africa were 
regarded as being in transit to the border and thus no duty was paid to the 
German authorities. But goods passing through Mombasa were liable to customs 
duties which were collected and retained by the East Africa Protectorate 
authorities. No rebates or allowances were made in respect of duties already 
paid at ports outside the Protectorate with the exception of Mombasa - if 
importers could produce a receipt from that port, no duties were collected 
by the Ugandan authorities. Although in 1900 imports reaching Uganda via 
Mombasa were negligible, once the railway reached the shores of Lake Victoria, 
Mombasa assumed greater importance with the diversion of trade away from the 
southern, German ports. Uganda thus found herself in the unenviable position 
of having an increasing volume of imports while at the same time, the collection 
of import duties was decreasing. Customs duties were raised to 107. ad valorem 
on all imports in 1904 but revenue still fell short of expenditure and it was 
not until 1909 that Kenya agreed to reimburse Uganda for the revenue thus 
collected, leading to a more than three-fold increase in Uganda's revenue in 
the period 1908/9 to 1917/18. (5) 
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In 1917, when Uganda's revenue collections had become negligible, the 
customs authorities of Kenya and Uganda were amalgamated and free trade, both 
in local and imported products, was established between the two territories,, 
The major aim of the external tariff was to raise revenue, rather than to 
protect local industry and at this time, the inter-territorial transfer of 
local products was virtually negligible. 
In 1921, with Tanganyika now under British control, the basic rate of 
duty was raised from 10% to 20%. This increase appears to have been for the 
sole benefit of Kenya because of her need to raise revenue, and Uganda would 
certainly have benefited from a reduction of customs duties in order to offset 
the substantial rail charges incurred in transporting her imports from the 
coast. But the balance of political power had altered (at the end of the 
19th century, Uganda had been the centre of British interests in East Africa) 
and Kenyan (European) interests were not dominant. 
A major feature of the history of European settlement in Kenya was the 
repeated attempts of the settlers to grasp both political and financial control, 
especially in the formulation of government policy, and the growing economic 
difficulties of the 192C's appeared to provide them with such an opportunity. 
An Economic and Finance Committee (the Bowring Committee) was appointed by the 
Kenya Government in 1922, a major recommendation of which was a policy of high 
tariff protection for agriculture. A new tariff was proposed which combined 
both specific and ad valorem duties, the main purpose of which was to protect 
the Colony's agriculture and promote the development of industry within Kenya. 
When the new tariff structure was introduced in 1924, highly protective duties 
were imposed on the import of butter, ham, ghee, timber, sugar, wheat and 
other grains and, to quote Kennedy, "...there can be no doubt that these duties 
did prove to be highly successful in encouraging a number of Kenya's industries 
in a period when world economic conditions were far from conducive to 
agricultural development." (6) 
The Kenya Government appointed a further committee in 1928 to consider 
the whole question of protective duties and the future of the customs union. 
The Report concluded that it was essential to retain the principle of 
protection and that every possible effort should be made to "....entrench the 
position in respect of a Customs Union for Eastern Africa provided that the 
principle of adequate protection is maintained." (7) Statistics were quoted 
illustrating the impressive growth of Kenya's agriculture and agricultural 
processing industries in the period 1922 to 1928 and particular reference 
was made to the increased production of bacon, ham, butter, cheese, sugar, 
timber and sawmilling' and wheat and flour. But the members of the Committee 
were not unanimous in their praise of protective policies. The Minority 
Report alleged that protective duties were too high and were penalising 
consumers in all three territories and that the main beneficiary of the duties. 
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especially in the case of wheat and butter, was the European farmer. Needless 
to say, these objections did not come from a European member of the Committee 
but from the President of the Indian Merchants Chamber in Mombasa. 
The Uganda Government' counter-attacked with a report of its own. (8) 
The Committee recalled the many objections voiced by Ugandan interests against 
the imposition of protective duties in 1924, and reiterated Uganda's 
"laissez faire" position with respect to international trade. If locally produced 
goods could not compete with imported articles with only the natural protection 
of transport costs, it was considered to be completely unjustified to develop 
artificially these industries by means of preferential railway rates and 
import duties, which benefited one country at the expense of others. If a 
government thought that an industry was deserving of support, assistance 
should be given by means of a bon<'.~: or subsidy at the expense of the country 
concerned. 
It is of interest to note that the Ugandan report attached greater 
importance to the continuation of the common market arrangements than was the 
case with the Kenya Tariff Committee Report. Thus although the Ugandan report 
recommended a general tariff of not more than 10% ad valorem or its equivalent, 
it realised that this would not be acceptable to Kenya and in order to preserve 
the customs union, it was prepared to accept a general rate of duty of 207. ad 
valorem or its equivalent. But this was as far as the Coirmittee was prepared 
to go: "If...the tariff recommendations generally, which we have made, fail 
to satisfy our neighbours, we are unanimously of the opinion that there should 
be a departure from the principle of a Customs Union, much as we should regret 
such a decision." (9) 
The controversy between Kenya and Uganda petered out with the onset of 
the world depression with Uganda abandoning her free trade position. A revised 
tariff was introduced in 1930, a major objective of which was to aid the 
establishment of local industry. The Customs Tariff Ordinance of 1930 introduced 
a system of "suspended £ut.ies." which were included in the schedules of the 
Common Tariff but were not imposed by the Tariff Ordinance itself. Rather, they 
were imposed by Proclamation, issued by the Governor with the approval of the 
Legislative Council in any of the three territories. They were in fact a 
surtax, levied over and above the common basic tariff, on imports into that 
territory alone from abroad and were effective with respect to the following 
products: butter, cheese, wheat in the grain, wheat ground, bacon and ham, 
ghee, joinery products, wood and timber, sugar and rice in the grain. 
Uganda imposed duties on only two of the product categories - ground wheat 
and bacon and ham. Kenya imposed the duty on all the listed products (in some 
cases doubling the rate of duty charged on imports) and Tanganyika imposed them 
on all the products with the exception of butter, cheese and wheat in the grain. 
6 
Tanganyika had become a League of Nations Mandated Territory under 
British control in 1922„ It adopted the common basic tariff of 20% in the 
same year but full agreement on the local transfer of imported goods was 
not reached until 1927 and it is from this date that the customs union 
took on all its essential characteristics, except for the actual amalgamation 
of Tanganyika's customs department with those of the other two territories 
which did not take place until 1949, In two essential respects, Tanganyika's 
position within the customs union was different from that of Uganda: 
a. her geographical position vis-a-vis Kenya meant that she was 
dependent on Kenya for neither port nor rail facilities, and, 
b„ because transport costs on imported goods were lower, the outcry 
against high import duties was not as marked as in Uganda-
In the Tanganyika Government's Annual Report for 1932 (10), the 
customs union was strongly defended- The absence of barriers was considered 
to be a matter of the utmost convenience to traders in the three territories 
and the union was of definite advantage in "promoting the development and 
prosperity of the whole area-" (11) The Report went on to state that: 
"Without the protected markets in Kenya and Uganda provided under the 
Agreements, not only could there be a little expansion in the Tanganyika 
production of rice, ghee, etc-, but the disposal even of existing produce 
would be very difficult---(and)----further, the absence of a Customs barrier 
enables producers in Tanganyika of articles intended for export overseas to 
avail themselves of manufacturing processes which are available in Kenya-" (12) 
The Tanganyika Government Report attempted to answer the Criticisms of 
Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith (13) who had alleged that the tariff was harmful to 
both consumer and producer interests in the territory- He noted that import 
duties were very high on all protected articles, especially on foodstuffs and 
the cheaper kinds of cotton goodc and he admitted that, on a priori grounds, 
the concept of a large East African Territory, without customs barriers and 
open to the free exchange of goods, was extremely attractive- But such a 
concept had to be subjected to the test of fact and experience and his 
conclusions as to the workings of the customs union were definitely 
unfavourable- Revenue had been falling while imports, especially of bacon, 
ham, sugar, tea and butter, had been rising quite substantially- The actual 
loss of customs revenue through the free imports from Kenya and Uganda of 
sugar, wheat, flour, tea, butter, bacon and ham, cheese and timber was 
estimated at £58,359 for 1931, and this loss was not offset "by the advantage 
to its (Tanganyika's) producers of exporting rice and ghee to the neighbouring 
territories free of duty-" (14) 
This would appear to be an early recognition and isolation of one of 
the major problems facing the Raisman Commission in 1960, although Armitage-
Smith' s proposed solution to the problem was more direct than that recommended 
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by the Raismcr: Cc&missioi:. He recommended that Tanganyika immediately take 
steps to levy customs import duty at the same rate on foodstuffs imported 
from Kenya and Uganda as those chargeable on foodstuffs imported from foreign 
countries, thus ceasing "to deplete, her revenue and impoverish her citizens 
by protecting the products of her neighbours." (15) But his recommendation 
was accepted with respect to sugar imports only, with a consumption tax at 
the rate of Shs.3/- per ICO lb. being imposed on all sugar not manufactuered 
in Tanganyika. 
Two further areas of controversy which can only be given brief mention 
here .were the structure of railway later; and the proposals for closer political 
union. Upto 1920, the profits earned on the operation of the railway were 
siphoned, off into the Kenya Treasury, but the Colonial Office ruled that this 
policy should be discontinued and that future surpluses from the railway 
were to be used fcr renewals, upkeep and betterment, future loan charges and 
the reduction of railway rates. Uganda also alleged thet the rate structure 
was used as a protect:73 instrument for Kenyan agriculture and industry 
(adversely affecting Ugandan development) but this charge was never 
satisfactorily proven. (10) 
The federation/closer union issue was a protracted and complicated 
.issue. The arrival of European settlers in Kenya Colony \ms a mixed blessing 
to ,t>3 British Government. European settlement meant the economic development 
of the area and the consolidation of British influence but in the political 
sphere, tensions soon arose between the settlers and the British Government. 
The settlers demand for a greater degree of independence in political and 
financial matters could not be accommodated by the British Government and 
although in 1922, Winston Churchill (then Colonial Secretary) had announced 
that he saw no reason why Kenya should not become "a characteristically and 
distinctively Eritish Colony looking forward in the full fruition of time to 
complete responsible self-government" (17) the White Paper of 1923 declared 
that self-government vras out of the quaction in the near future (although this 
status had been given to the Rhodesian rettlcrs in that year) and asserted the 
paramouncy of African interests. 
A number of commissions and indi/iduals reported on the prospects for 
political federation in the 1920's and early 1930
!
s (18) and although their 
conclusions as to the advisibiiity of oolitical federation differed, they all 
agreed that the time was not yet ripe for such a m o v e . The final commission 
to consider this question - a Joint Se.'ect Committee, of both Houses of the 
British Parliament which reported in 1"31 - decidcd against any radical move 
towards political federation or close : union for the following reasons: 
a. it was inopportune on purely financial grci nds - East Africa was 
passing through a serious ec>ncmic depression and anything that added 
to. the overhead expenses cf ;cvernment was viewed with disfavour; 
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bo the Africans of Uganda and Tanganyika were still opposed to any 
form of closer association with Kenya; 
Co lack of communications would impose a serious limitation on the 
authority of any organization with executive functions throughout 
the area, and, 
do the vast majority of all the communities were still concerned 
mainly with the affairs of their own particular territory and only 
among certain elements in the European community could there be 
said to be a growing East African consciousnesso 
From 1930 onwards the three Governor."- met annually and in addition to 
discussing the shared services (the Kenya and Uganda Railway, customs, defence, 
posts and telegraphs) dealt with a wide range of topics including the 
co-ordination of African taxation, transport and communications and 
industrialisation- But the earlier grandiose ideas cn federation were quietly 
shelved, if .only temporarily, mainly because of the world economic depression-
The Second World War made it essential fci the East African territories 
to pool their resources for a combined war effort and in 1940, the Governors 
of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland agreed 
to establish a joint economic council, with its own secretariate, thus 
enabling East Africa to operate as one economic and commercial unit- A number 
of ad hoc bodies, operating on an East African basis, were established (19) and 
the organisations under the Governors' Conference were extended. 
At the end of the war it was decided that the whole question of future 
economic co-operation should be investigated, with particular emphasis being 
placed on the operation of the common services between the three countries-
The Colonial Office published a paper in 1945 (20) outlining proposals for the 
organisation and form future co-operation should take. Political union in any 
form was rejected but it was thought necessary to establish a constitutional 
and juridical framework for the inter-territorial services, including a joint 
legislature- The proposed racial composition of the latter (it was proposed 
to give the three main races numerical equality in the unofficial representation 
in the central legislature) caused an outcry among Kenyan Europeans and 
revised proposals were consequently drafted and published in 1947- (21) These 
abandoned the idea of numerical parity and severely reduced the powers of the 
proposed central legislature and weakei.ed its financial structure- The 
proposals of Colonial No-210 were acceytad and subsequently implemented by 
the East Africa (High Commission) Order in Council, 1947 and came into 
operation on January lot, 1948-
It is fair to say that an import?r.*" opportunity for the further 
strengthening and development of the customs union was lost by the specific 
form the establishment of the High Coi mission took. If it had been empowered 
9-
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to act in a positive role in the co-ordination of economic affairs and policies, 
the patte rn of development in East Africa would probably have taken a completely 
different form- An attempt was made to resolve differences of interest 
relating to industrial development with the establishment of a system of 
industrial licensing, but this system has not been particularly successful 
and has certainly had no influence on the pattern of industrial location 
within East Africa,, This is not to deny the important role played by the 
High Commission and the Central Legislative Assembly in East African affairs 
but the conditions the organisation laboured under, namely the lack of its 
own source of revenue and the restricted list of subjects with which it 
could deal, limited its usefulness for expressing an "East African point of 
view" (22) 
The Report of the East African Economic and Fiscal Commission. (23) 
During the late 1950's, the existing arrangements in East Africa 
were increasingly criticised by Uganda and Tanganyika. The major problem 
considered by the Commission was that posed by the rapid development of import 
substituting industries in Kenya which adversely affected the fiscal revenues 
of the other two territories while benefiting Kenya. The Commission concluded 
that although Kenya had benefited to the greatest extent from the operation of 
the common market, it was unlikely that Uganda and Tanganyika had actually 
lost on income account (owing to the "spill-over" effects of Kenya's faster 
rate of growth of income on the income of the other two countries). The 
Commission proposed the creation of a Distributable Pool of Revenue to offset 
the losses incurred by Uganda and Tanganyika on revenue account but this was 
essentially a temporary measure because it did not go to the root of the 
problem i.e. the uneven rates of industrial development of the three countries. 
But in general, the proposals of the Commission were of importance insofar as 
they ensured the continuation of inter-territorial institutional co-operation 
(the East African Common Services Organisation was established in 1961) and 
they also helped to generate a climate favourable to foreign investment. 
Although the Raisman Commission did not produce a lasting solution to the 
problems of the common market, its porposals did provide a significant short 
term relaxation of tensions and given the general limitations on the power 
of any official commission and the political climate of the time, one could 
not reasonably expect more than that. 
The Failure to Federate and the "Kampala Agreement". 
With the coming of Independence to the three, countries, the problems of 
inter-territorial economic co-operation and political federation again assumed 
prominence. The common market had always been a colonial animal, imposed by 
Britain on the three East African countries and it was not immediately clear 
whether the three countries, as independent units, would opt .for greater 
economic and political co-Operation or whether existing institutions would 
break up and the three states go their separate ways. African opposition 
.....11. 
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towards the High Commission had gradually waned and even as early as 1960, 
the idea was put forward that the High Commission might form the basis of a 
political federation. The concept of political federation had been opposed 
by the nationalist leaders as it had always been associated with the political 
ambitions of the Kenyan and Rhodesian settlers but in 1960, Julius Nyerere 
came out strongly in its favour and even indicated that Tanganyika might 
postpone the date of her own independence so that the three countries could 
achieve independence and unity at the same time. 
The discussion of federation culminated in the Nairobi Declaration of 
5th June, 1963. President Nyerere and Prime Ministers Obote and Kenyatta 
stated their intention of establishing a federation by the end of 1963. The 
failure to federate is now well known and the reasons for the failure have 
been well documented by J.S. Nye, Jnr. (24). What is of importance to the 
present discussion is that the collapse of the negotiations forced the 
Tanganyikan leaders to make a serious reappraisal of the whole common 
market/federation question. They were not so completely disillusioned as 
to exclude entirely the possibility of federation at some future date, but 
national self-interest came to play an increasingly important role in their 
deliberations. The decision was made that, in the absence of federation, the 
common market arrangements could not be allowed to remain unchanged if 
Tanganyikan development was hindered as a result of them. 
In March 1964, a meeting of the Joint Economic Committee was convened 
at Entebbe at the request of the three Heads of Government and the Tanganyikan 
delegation announced its intention of pursuing a line of economic policy which 
would in effect remove that country from the common market. This announcement 
led to an urgent meeting of the Heads of Government and their economic 
Ministers and it was decided to appoint an Emergency Committee of Ministers 
of Finance and of Commerce and Industry, the purpose of which was "to enquire 
into the measures necessary to bring about a trade balance between the three 
East African countries." (25) The Emergency Committee met immediately in 
Dar es Salaam and was reconvened in Kampala in April 1964, to agree on the 
detailed proposals which have since become known as the "Kampala Agreement". 
The "Kampala Agreement" was essentially an attempt to redress the 
inequalities that had arisen through the three countries' different rates 
of industrial development, rather than an attempt to impose bilateral 
trading conditions on inter-territorial trade. It proposed, inter alia, the 
expansion in the deficit countries of production by certain inter-
territorially connected firms, the immediate territorial allocation of 
certain major industries, the application of a system of quotas and 
suspended quotas whereby exports from surplus countries could be 
progressively decreased and local production stimulated in the deficit 
countries and early agreement within the common market on a system of 
.....11. 
inducements to allocate industry between the three countries to ensure a more 
equitable distribution-
The detailed proposals of the "Agreement" are well known and need not 
be documented here- The "Agreement" was never formally ratified by Kenya, 
but almost immediately, Tanganyika began imposing quotas on imports of 
manufactured goods from Kenya and Uganda- The direct result of the 
application of the quota system - the loss of the Tanganyikan market to 
many Ugandan and Kenyan firms - led, in many cases, to substantial cuts in 
production and the threat of dismissal to large numbers of workers- This 
was a process that occurred in virtually all the major firms in a wide variety 
of industrial activities - miscellaneous foods, soap and detergents, paints 
and varnishes, spinning and weaving, clothing, biscuits and confectionary, 
chemicals and insecticides, matches, paper and packaging materials, cigarettes, 
bicycle tyres and tubes, industrial gases, brewing, miscellaneous textiles 
and metal and engineering products- A number of cases were noted of the 
actual physical movement of firms located in Kenya moving to Tanganyika. 
The provisic .5 of the "Agreement" concerning the immediate allocation 
of certain industries were never completely carried out and the proposed 
appointment of a committee of experts to formulate proposals for the future 
allocation of industry was never heard of again- The "Agreement" did result 
in a quite substantial increase in Tanganyika's industrial capacity but at 
the cost of the development of surplus capacity elsewhere in East Africa and 
the disruption of trade- The common market ceased to be a common market in 
the true sense of the term and it is obvious that such disruptive conditions 
could not have continued for any substantial length of time without the 
complete disintegration of East Africa as a single economic unit. 
Industrial Location and the Common Market. 
The analysis of the pattern of industrial location in East Africa is 
made within a least-cost framework. An earlier paper (26) has attempted 
(albeit rather primitively) to apply modern theory i.e. theories of location 
based on monopolistic control considerations, to location within East Africa, 
but it was concluded that the theory was not of practical use in explaining 
the locational pattern established and the lack of relevant data severely 
limited the extent to which sophisticated criteria could be used- The 
analysis thus assumes that most firms sell to a single buying centre and 
determine their location with reference to that centre on least-cost principles. 
Two questionnaire surveys were carried out in Kenya, one attempting to 
collect data on transport costs and the other attempting to determine the major 
factors influencing industrial location, with particular reference to common 
market industries i.e. those industries requiring the whole of the East African 
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market to operate profitably. 
The transport cost survey did not produce good results and only eight 
firms (out of a total of over fifty) provided data sufficiently comprehensive 
for analytical purposes. Although it is not possible to generalise on the 
basis of such meagre information, it appeared that raw material transport 
costs were rather small and the transport cost differential on imported raw 
materials between a Nairobi and a Kampala location did not increase total 
production costs by more than 0.67. in all cases except two. Distribution costs 
i.e. the cost of bulk transport of the finished product to the distribution 
centre, were the most important element in transport costs. The results of 
survey thus implied that much industrial activity was to a large extent 
"shiftable" in the sense that raw material transport costs did not tie it 
to any particular location and that nearness to the major market area was the 
dominant location factor. 
This argument had already been substantially confirmed by the results 
of the Uganda survey of industrial location (27) and further supporting 
evidence was obtained in the Kenya survey. In the latter, questionnaires were 
sent to 126 firms, each employing over fifty persons, and a 67. response rate 
was achieved. At least 307. of the Kenyan firms replying depended to a very 
large extent on exports to Uganda and Tanganyika. 
Particular attention was paid to the growth and development of Nairobi (28). 
Nairobi is the largest concentration of industrial activity in both Kenya (447. 
of all firms employing over five persons are located in Nairobi) (29) and East 
Africa, and the common market based firms located in Nairobi were virtually 
unanimous in stating that the market factor was the locational determinant of 
prime importance. Nairobi, as the administrative, commercial, financial and 
industrial centre of Kenya (and, to a large extent, East Africa), offered the 
largest market and its geographical position offered excellent opportunities 
for the export of manufactured goods to Uganda and Tanganyika. 
The question of the role of "external economies of scale" in Nairobi's 
industrial development is an elusive and controversial one. Even the concept 
itself is sometimes difficult to pin down, but for the purposes of the present 
discussion, it is sufficient to examine four relatively distinct variations, 
viz: Technological external economies, pecuniary external economies, market 
enlargement external economies and external economies arising from vertical 
integration. (30). 
It is usually assumed that Nairobi enjoys the benefits accruing from the 
existence of significant external economies. B.F. Massell (31) for example, in 
discussing the relative gains to be expected from the development of new 
industry, confidently asserts (although he produces no evidence to support his 
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argument) that "...the advantage of Nairobi's becoming a large industrial 
centre may provide some benefits to Uganda and Tanganyika as well as Kenya. 
For example, the existence of skilled technicians and engineers and the 
availability of spare parts and components in Nairobi facilitates the 
establishment of new industry elsewhere in East Africa. But while this is 
undoubtedly true, it is also true that the externalities are stronger in 
Nairobi than elsewhere." Massell further asserts that beyond some "critical 
point" external diseconomies arise and development becomes more diversified, 
but he does not attempt to define further that "critical point" nor does he 
say whether or not Nairobi has reached it or is near such a point in its 
development. He later casts doubt on his earlier generalisations concerning 
"externalities" when he admits that "The biggest question mark is the external 
economies factor...(and)...until economists know a great deal more about these 
phenomena, we shall be unable to quantify the gains from externalities."(32). 
The only concept of "external economies" that appears to have relevance 
to Nairobi is that of market enlargement external economies i.e. mass 
consumption industries mutually support one another to a certain extent insofar 
as they provide markets for each other's products. The dividing line between 
this concept and the simple market orientation factor is not a clear-cut one 
and confusion would arise if the location of a particular industry was 
ascribed exclusively to either factor. External economies arising from 
vertical integration are not at present of practical importance within Nairobi, 
(33) but could arise in the relatively near future as the "depth" of Nairobi's 
industrial development increases. Scitovsky's technological external economies 
are present in all East African industrial centres insofar as one assumes that 
industrial labour markets did not exist before the establishment of the first 
industrial enterprises and that all subsequent enterprises freely enjoyed the 
benefits of the labour market created by the pioneer industrialists. Similarly, 
pecuniary external economies, if they exist at all in East Africa, are 
certainly not more significant in Nairobi than elsewhere. 
The intention.of the above disucssion is not to deny the fact that 
"There are frequently large gains from an industry's choosing a site with 
well developed ancillary industries, a trained labour force, and social overhead 
capital facilities..(and)...the presence of some firms in an area will enhance 
the area's attractiveness to newcomers, and in this way industrial clusters 
will develop." (34) What is being questioned is the commonly accepted notion 
that Nairobi has attractions of an external economies nature not found in the 
other industrial centres of East Africa and that these factors explain, to a 
very large extent, Nairobi's attractiveness to new industry. 
Indeed, a strong case can be made for the existence of significant 
external diseconomies of scale in Nairobi. Land prices and labour costs combine 
to make Nairobi a high cost location (relative to other centres in Kenya) in 
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terms of processing costs, and it can be argued that it is only the market 
factor that more than compensates for the high processing costs of a Nairobi 
location. The factor that was unique in Nairobi's development was the strong 
European influence. Both directly and indirectly, the Europeans generated 
the market for manufactured goods, and their political strength permitted 
them to dictate economic policies within East Africa which were to their 
direct advantage. The fact that Nairobi is a "European" city (compared to 
Kampala and Dar es Salaam) is probably of some significance but it is felt 
that it would be misleading to place too much emphasis on this factor. 
The higher African per capita incomes in Uganda (especially Buganda) (35) 
attracted two large industries whose main orientation was towards the African 
consumer (bicycle tyres and tubes and agricultural hoes), but in general, the 
concentration of purchasing power in the Nairobi region dominated the pattern 
of industrial location iu East Africa. Tanganyika has enjoyed the benefits of 
neither an economically and politically powerful European community not a 
relatively wealthy and geographically concentrated African market and thus has 
not been successful in attracting large scale, common market based, industries. 
With the growth of incomes in East Africa (or as in the case of 
Tanganyika, with the cutting off of existing markets), industry is likely to 
become more widely distributed between the three countries, although Kenya is 
likely to remain the most industrialised partner. But it is felt that market 
forces alone will not be strong enough to bring about a distribution of 
industry in the near future that will be acceptable to all three countries and it 
is thus recommended that a policy oi planned industrial allocation and location 
should be put into effect as soon as possible. It is further suggested that, 
in the absence of Government direction, some system of transport cost subsidies 
would appear to be the most effective way of persuading firms to establish 
themselves at a location they had not originally chosen. 
A Note on the Treaty for East African Co-operation. 
The Treaty for East African Co-operation represented an extremely 
important step forward in East African political and economic relations. The 
provisions of the Treaty include, inter alia, the creation of an East African 
Community and a strengthened common market within that Community, the 
establishment of four statutory corporations within the Community to administer 
the shared services, the abolition of quantitative restrictions on inter-
territorial trade (with certain exceptions) and the introduction of a transfer 
tax system aimed at eliminating inter-territorial trade deficits in manufactured 
goods, the establishment of the East. African Development Bank, the harmonisation 
of fiscal incentives and (less specifically) the formation of co-ordinated 
policies towards large single plant industries requiring the whole of the 
East African market and the decentralisation of the headquarters of the various 
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institutions of the Community and the common market. 
An important aspect of the Treaty is the abolition of quantitative 
restrictions on inter-territorial trade. Although it could be argued that 
there is no essential difference quantitative restrictions and the transfer 
tax system, the latter will at least allow some degree of inter-territorial 
trade and competition in manufactured goods which had previously been subject 
to quotas or outright prohibition. But both systems are subject to the 
criticism mentioned earlier in the paper - they tend to encourage competitive, 
rather than complementary, industrial development, leading to excess capacity 
and the probable misuse of scarce resources. Taking into account political 
considerations, such development appears to be inevitable, but it must still 
be labelled "undesirable" rather than "desirable". 
It is of interest to note that industrial locat: nor r.r i* vet 
mentioned in the Treaty and in this respect, the Development Bank will have 
an important role to play. The Bank is required to loan, guarantee or 
otherwise invest as nearly as is possible, 38%% of its total investments in 
Tanzania, 38%% in Uganda and 22%% in Kenya, in order to accelerate the 
industrial development of the relatively less industrialised Partner States, 
with the proviso that such development should be complementary, rather than 
competitive, in nature. But the mere fact of specifying different investment 
ratios between the three countries does not mean that existing industrial 
imbalances will automatically be reduced. If the Bank is more successful in 
attracting private capital into joint venture schemes in Kenya than it is in 
the other two countries, nothing will be done to reduce the inequitable 
distribution of industry and it is possible that it will be increased. The 
need for a co-ordinated and comprehensive policy of industrial allocation 
between the three countries is still essential, for economic, social and 
political reasons, and if a wider and more equitable distribution of industry 
is not achieved, the future foundations of the common market may prove to be 
as weak as those cf the past, resulting once more in political tensions and 
economic disruption. 
Conclus ion. 
This paper has attempted to analyse briefly the relationship between 
the location of industry and the common market in East Africa. Stress has been 
laid on the historical continuity of certain factors and it has been argued that 
the problems that have arisen in the 1960's are essentially the outcome of 
political, social and economic developments, the origins of which can be traced 
to the early part of the 20th century. Throughout its history, the common 
market has demonstrated a remarkable resilence to the tensions and potentially 
destructive forces which have been generated by its operation and the Treaty 
for East African Co-operation is an indication of the extent to which 
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antagonisms in both the economic and political spheres have been overcome 
and an affirmation of the strength and importance of the ties that have 
for so long bound the three countries together. 
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